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Existing research suggests that different types of violent extremist organizations utilize 
distinct approaches to radicalize and mobilize potential recruits online. Specifically, previous 
studies indicate that Violent Islamic Extremist (VIE) groups attempt to create virtual breeding 
grounds that mimic in-person socialization. Conversely, Radical Right Extremist (RRE) 
organizations forgo web-based community-building efforts, preferring instead to proliferate mass 
amounts of alternative ideological propaganda to subvert mainstream narratives. There is little 
research examining whether the phenomenon continues at the actor level among the individuals 
actually committing terrorist attacks. Therefore, this study qualitatively investigates whether 
web-based behaviors differ by actor type through a comparative case study analysis. To do so, 
the research explores the radicalization of perpetrators prior to six terrorist attacks in the United 
States. 
The study tests the hypotheses that internet behaviors vary by actor type (H1), with VIE 
subjects presenting more interactive online engagement (HIa) and RRE subjects showing more 
one-way absorption of information (H1b). The resulting evidence does not support the 
hypotheses as little discernible difference has been discovered between the online radicalization 
behaviors that VIE and RRE actors partook in. In fact, the results suggest that if a difference 
does exist, it is that RRE perpetrators engage in more online interaction than VIE counterparts. 
However, this slight discrepancy results from a case with inconclusive data due to contradictory 
reports. Therefore, the findings show little significant difference in online radicalization among 
actor types.  
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Radicalization is a process that leads from cognitive opening to extremist cognition or 
behavior. Traditionally, radicalization is considered to be a social phenomenon that occurs within 
social networks with direct interaction. However, advancements in technology, the rise of social 
media, and the ubiquity of the web allow the internet to mimic the socialization process. This has 
led to academic debate as to whether radicalization is possible in an entirely virtual setting. More 
recently, however, it has become increasingly evident that comparing the impacts of online 
versus in-person socialization creates a false dichotomy, as aspects of both modes are typically 
present in most contemporary cases. As such, studies have shifted to determining how the 
internet is utilized to augment radicalization. Existing research attempts to establish how the 
internet is employed by different types of extremist groups to recruit potential violent actors to 
their ideological cause. A comparative assessment between Violent Islamic Extremists (VIE) and 
Radical Right Extremist (RRE) organizations shows that VIE groups attempt to cultivate virtual 
communities that replace in-person socialization, while RRE actors hope to awaken aggrieved 
individuals to a cause by replacing mainstream cognition.1 However, there is insufficient 
empirical data indicating how the targeted individuals engage with such attempts.  
 This study examines how violent radical actors connect with online content throughout 
the radicalization process. Existing literature suggests that VIE actors may undergo a more 
interactive virtual experience in which the exchange of ideas socializes radical ideology. 
Conversely, the web-based strategies of RRE groups insinuate that radical right actors consume 
extremist material with little two-way interaction. To test that assumption, this research 
 
1 J. M. Berger, “Nazis vs. ISIS on Twitter: A Comparative Study of White Nationalist and ISIS Online Social Media 




compares six case studies, three among each group, to uncover which trends were present during 
the radicalization process leading up to significant terror attacks in the United States. The 
information derived from this study is important for shaping law enforcement, counterterrorism, 
and intelligence policies aimed at preventing or interdicting the radicalization of domestic and 
homegrown violent extremists. The findings are particularly pertinent as the COVID-19 
pandemic has heightened grievances and increased the cumulative time individuals spend online.   
Part I: Literature Review 
The following literature review is divided into three parts. First, it explores complex 
topics of radicalization and socialization. Second, it summarizes current debates surrounding the 
role the internet plays in the radicalization of ideological actors. Finally, it analyzes existing 
studies which compare internet usage by violent extremist type. For the sake of the study, 
extremist actors are defined as those who utilize terror and violence against civilians to achieve 
ideological, economic, religious, social, or political objectives.2  
Radicalization and Socialization  
Radicalization is a process that leads 
individuals or groups to reject accepted norms 
and legitimize violence. There are several 
theories that attempt to capture radicalization in 
useful, predictive models, each of which depicts 
successive, escalatory steps from cognitive 
opening to extremist event. For example, Randy 
 
2 “What Is Violent Extremism?,” Page, Federal Bureau of Investigation, accessed February 12, 2021, 
https://www.fbi.gov/cve508/teen-website/what-is-violent-extremism. 
3 Randy Borum, “Radicalization into Violent Extremism II: A Review of Conceptual Models and Empirical 
Research,” Journal of Strategic Security 4, no. 4 (November 2011): 39. 






Borum, a strategy and intelligence scholar, describes the process as having four stages. Borum’s 
model, shown in Figure 1, begins with the establishment of the grievance, develops into a 
narrative of injustice, is followed by attribution of blame, and culminates with justifications of 
violence.4 Borum’s model is simple, clear, and representative of similar paradigms without 
focusing too heavily on specific ideologies associated with extremism. It demonstrates that the 
radicalization process does not require militant training or formal indoctrination. It is not an 
anomaly that occurs abroad, nor is it limited to officially recognized terrorist organizations. 
Instead, the radicalization process can occur in any setting in which aggrieved, at-risk individuals 
find violent justifications through extremist narratives.  
Traditionally, exposure to and adoption of radical ideologies are examined through the 
framework of socialization, with some scholars defining radicalization as an inherently social 
process.5 Social networks provide initial exposure to extremist ideologies and a space to 
normalize escalatory cognition and behaviors. Researchers examining the radicalization and 
socialization phenomenon in Peru’s Sendero Luminoso insurgency explained that “friendship 
networks are extremely important for social radicalization, since they can become the main 
normative values source, they provide emotional rewards, sense of belonging, totality and 
significance.”6 The rejection of societal norms and the adoption of extremist perceptions may 
result in negative consequences; therefore, “the more costly and dangerous the collective action, 
 
4 Randy Borum, “Radicalization into Violent Extremism II: A Review of Conceptual Models and Empirical 
Research,” Journal of Strategic Security 4, no. 4 (November 2011): 39. 
5 Mohammed Hafez and Creighton Mullins, “The Radicalization Puzzle: A Theoretical Synthesis of Empirical 
Approaches to Homegrown Extremism,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 38, no. 11 (November 2015): 960, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2015.1051375. 
6 Eli Malvaceda-Espinoza, Juan Herrero, and Jossue Correa, “Socialización y Radicalización Política En Militantes 
Del Partido Comunista Del Perú–Sendero Luminoso (PCP-SL),” Convergencia Revista de Ciencias Sociales, June 
25, 2018, 1247, https://doi.org/10.29101/crcs.v25i78.4657. 
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the stronger and more numerous the ties required for individuals to participate.”7 Studies 
conducted by Sageman and Stern in the early 2000s both highlighted the importance of social 
interaction on the psychological radicalization process.8 In fact, research conducted by Stern 
suggested that peer pressure can, at times, be a more persuasive force than the overall objective 
in pushing individuals toward radical beliefs and deviant behaviors.9 Ultimately, the socialization 
of radical ideals enables the psychological conditions necessary to foster extremism. It is this 
social dynamic of radicalization that raises questions as to the role of the internet within the 
overall process.  
The Contested Role of the Internet  
 There is ongoing academic debate regarding the extent to which the internet can affect 
the radicalization process. It is generally agreed that terrorist and insurgent operations utilize 
virtual opportunities to research targets, communicate, train, fundraise, and propagate ideological 
agendas.10 Thus, the discussion is not over whether the internet plays a role in radicalization, but 
if it can act as the singular factor in the process. For instance, author and journalist Jason Burke 
once argued that radicalization is a complex experience that requires close personal relationship 
to progress.11 This supports Sageman’s 2004 claims that, while the internet may appeal to the 
isolated, aggrieved individual by providing a virtual community, “he still needs to undergo an 
intense period of face-to-face interaction to check for his commitment and devotion to the cause 
 
7 Donatella Della Porta and Mario Diani, “Individuals, Networks, and Participation,” in Social Movements an 
Introduction, 2nd ed. (New Jersey: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 119, 
https://ares.library.jhu.edu/ares/ares.dll?Action=10&Type=10&Value=636383. 
8 Thomas J. Holt, Joshua D. Freilich, and Steven M. Chermak, “Internet-Based Radicalization as Enculturation to 
Violent Deviant Subcultures,” Deviant Behavior 38, no. 8 (September 27, 2016): 857, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/01639625.2016.1197704. 
9 Ibid.  
10 Barbara Mantel, “Terrorism and the Internet: Should Web Sites That Promote Terrorism Be Shut Down?,” CQ 
Global Researcher 3, no. 11 (November 2009): 130. 
11 Jason Burke, “Al-Shabab’s Tweets Won’t Boost Its Cause | Jason Burke,” The Guardian, December 16, 2011, 
sec. Opinion, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/dec/16/al-shabab-tweets-terrorism-twitter. 
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and generate bonds that will prevent him from betraying the cause.”12 However, Sageman’s 
theory predates the rise of social media and fails to account for the constant connectivity 
afforded by technological advances. Instead, a stronger argument notes the creation of false 
dichotomy in current terrorism studies, one that pits online and offline activities against each 
other rather than assessing them as parts of a whole.13 
This study does not attempt to determine if online or offline activities are more influential 
in the radicalization process. Rather, it understands that the internet “has become a primary 
operational environment, in which political ideologies are realized, attacks planned, and social 
movements made” and seeks to understand how it does so.14 Most literature suggests that 
technological advances have created new virtual breeding grounds which codify collective 
identities and enhance grievance narratives.15 This occurs because interactive interfaces allow 
individuals to engage with material in a manner that mimics direct socialization. Maura Conway 
explains, “today’s Internet does not simply allow for the dissemination and consumption of 
‘extremist material’ in a one-way broadcast from producer to consumer, but also high levels of 
online social interaction around this material.”16 For instance, chat rooms, social media, and 
interactive forums may connect extremists with potential recruits; video games provide social 
incentives and rewards; films or recordings attract larger numbers of viewers; and static websites 
 
12 Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004): 163. 
13 Paul Gill et al., “Terrorist Use of the Internet by the Numbers,” Criminology & Public Policy 16, no. 1 (February 
2017): 100, https://doi.org/10.1111/1745-9133.12249. 
14 Charlie Winter et al., “Online Extremism: Research Trends in Internet Activism, Radicalization, and Counter-
Strategies,” International Journal of Conflict & Violence 14, no. 2 (July 2020): 1, https://doi.org/10.4119/ijcv-3809. 
15 Thomas Holt et al., “Political Radicalization on the Internet: Extremist Content, Government Control, and the 
Power of Victim and Jihad Videos,” Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict 8, no. 2 (May 4, 2015): 107–20, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/17467586.2015.1065101. 
16 Maura Conway, “Determining the Role of the Internet in Violent Extremism and Terrorism: Six Suggestions for 




propagate ideology among the geographically dispersed.17 Each of these platforms provides a 
potentially addictive setting in which individuals can find promises of purpose, adventure, and 
community.18   
Virtual socialization expands extremist engagement beyond the scope afforded by face-
to-face interaction. This is aided by technological advances which allow the near omnipresence 
of the web. This ubiquity provides a larger potential audience for extremist agendas – one not 
constrained by traditional geographic considerations or societal barriers.19 Further, although in 
2004 Sageman disputed the internet’s ability to fully replace in-person socialization in the 
radicalization process, he did recognize its capacity to engage the otherwise inaccessible.  He 
notes that “it appeals to isolated individuals by easing their loneliness through connections to 
people sharing some commonality.”20 For those who are isolated from outside influences, hate-
filled virtual communities impact them psychologically by facilitating the formations of new 
identities, the legitimization of radical ideologies, and negotiation of moral boundaries.21 
Additionally, virtual interaction eases initiation into deviant cognition by allowing seemingly 
anonymous experimentation with extremist ideology. It does so by providing a sense of non-
 
17 Thomas Frissen, “Internet, the Great Radicalizer? Exploring Relationships between Seeking for Online Extremist 
Materials and Cognitive Radicalization in Young Adults,” Computers in Human Behavior 114 (January 2021): 
106549, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2020.106549; Thomas Holt et al., “Political Radicalization on the Internet: 
Extremist Content, Government Control, and the Power of Victim and Jihad Videos,” Dynamics of Asymmetric 
Conflict 8, no. 2 (May 4, 2015): 107–20, https://doi.org/10.1080/17467586.2015.1065101. 
18 Robin Thompson, “Radicalization and the Use of Social Media,” Journal of Strategic Security 4, no. 4 (2011): 
171, http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.4.4.8. 
19 Thomas J. Holt, Joshua D. Freilich, and Steven M. Chermak, “Internet-Based Radicalization as Enculturation to 
Violent Deviant Subcultures,” Deviant Behavior 38, no. 8 (September 27, 2016): 855–69, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/01639625.2016.1197704. 
20 Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004): 161. 
21 Lorraine Bowman-Grieve, “Exploring ‘Stormfront’: A Virtual Community of the Radical Right,” Studies in 
Conflict & Terrorism 32, no. 11 (October 30, 2009): 998, https://doi.org/10.1080/10576100903259951. 
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attribution, offering an ostensibly innocuous setting for individuals to engage anonymously in 
taboo behavior.22  
The normative effect of internet-based socialization is aided by the increasing prevalence 
of virtual echo chambers – or environments that present information from singular perspectives 
which reinforce opinions and create divergent realities.23 An essay penned by Jia Tolentino 
examined the effects of the internet on identity and found five key factors which effectively 
influenced user perception. According to Tolentino, “the final, and possibly most 
psychologically destructive distortion of the social internet is its distortion of scale. This is not an 
accident but an essential design feature: social media was constructed around the idea that a 
thing is important insofar as it is important to you.”24 
Technology feeds the ontological dilemma with useful algorithms designed to provide 
consumers with relevant information. The New York Times produced a podcast titled “Rabbit 
Hole” which narratively explored the web-based radicalization of a single individual. The 
podcast interviewed Guillaume Chaslot, a former YouTube employee, who designed algorithms 
to enhance the platform's usership. Chaslot explained that YouTube shifted away from tracking 
metrics by clicks per video and instead measures time spent on the platform.25 To increase 
viewership, YouTube created a recommendation system that encourages consumers to watch 
similar types of videos.26 The podcast argued that the resulting “rabbit hole” creates differing 
 
22 Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens, Audrey Alexander, and Nick Kaderbhai, “The Impact of Digital 
Communications Technology on Radicalization and Recruitment,” International Affairs 93, no. 5 (September 1, 
2017): 1238, https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iix103. 
23 “Digital Media Literacy: What Is an Echo Chamber?,” GCFGlobal.org, accessed February 11, 2021, 
https://edu.gcfglobal.org/en/digital-media-literacy/what-is-an-echo-chamber/1/. 
24 Jia Tolentino, “The I in Internet,” in Trick Mirror (New York: Random House, 2019), 28. 
25 Kevin Roose, “One: Wonderland,” New York Times: Rabbit Hole, accessed February 11, 2021, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/16/podcasts/rabbit-hole-internet-youtube-virus.html. 
26 Ibid.  
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realities for various audiences. 
Similarly, Google results can 
alter perceptions and intensify 
echo chambers. For instance, 
“results masquerade as relatively 
objective truths: why else would 
a link come up on the first page 
of the world’s most trusted 
search engine?”27 In these cases, 
top or recurring search results may give digital media false credibility, especially among 
populations that have difficulty critically evaluating the credibility of claims made by sites that 
appear in trusted search engines.28  
However, analyses of developing echo chambers may be overly simplified. A 
quantitative study conducted by a team of Penn State researchers suggests that recommendation 
algorithms may be far less culpable than media reports suggest.30 Instead, the researchers 
contend, radicalization on the platform may result from simple supply and demand.31 The pure 
mass of alternative content, created by low barrier of entry and high potential reward, has 
 
27 Rishi Chebrolu, “The Racial Lens of Dylann Roof: Racial Anxiety and White Nationalist Rhetoric on New 
Media,” Review of Communication 20, no. 1 (January 2020): 57, https://doi.org/10.1080/15358593.2019.1708441. 
28 Ibid.  
29 Paris Martineau, “Maybe It’s Not YouTube’s Algorithm That Radicalizes People,” Wired, October 23, 2019, 
https://www.wired.com/story/not-youtubes-algorithm-radicalizes-people/. 
30 Ibid.  
31 Kevin Munger and Joseph Phillips, “Right-Wing YouTube: A Supply and Demand Perspective,” The 
International Journal of Press/Politics, October 21, 2020, 1940161220964767, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1940161220964767. 





inundated the platform.32 The study found that among political radicals, interaction between 
account holders creates a highly accessible virtual forum, as seen in Figure 2.33 “These 
interactions, even if contentious, reinforce parasocial relationships between audience and creator 
and a sense of community between audience members.”34 The study emphasized that it is the 
internet’s unique ability to imitate real socialization, not its recommendation systems, that 
persuades and radicalizes individuals experiencing cognitive openings.35  
 Existing Comparative Studies  
 There are studies that comparatively assess internet usage among radical actor types. 
Much of this research seeks to quantitatively analyze engagement by group or platform. A study 
conducted by J.M. Berger at George Washington University examined Twitter trends among 
three groups: Nazis, White Nationalists, and ISIS. Berger found radical right groups consistently 
presented higher numbers of followers and tweets than the accounts held by ISIS affiliates.36 A 
similar study analyzing metrics of the online White Nationalist forum, Stormfront, and the jihadi 
website, al-Shumukh al-Islam, also found higher numbers of posts made annually by the radical 
right community.37  The extreme right has a long history of communicating ideology virtually, 
strategizing ways to optimize consumption and lower the threshold of participation.38 To do so, 
 
32 Paris Martineau, “Maybe It’s Not YouTube’s Algorithm That Radicalizes People,” Wired, October 23, 2019, 
https://www.wired.com/story/not-youtubes-algorithm-radicalizes-people/. 
33 Kevin Munger and Joseph Phillips, “Right-Wing YouTube: A Supply and Demand Perspective,” The 
International Journal of Press/Politics, October 21, 2020, 1940161220964767, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1940161220964767. 
34 Ibid.  
35 Paris Martineau, “Maybe It’s Not YouTube’s Algorithm That Radicalizes People,” Wired, October 23, 2019, 
https://www.wired.com/story/not-youtubes-algorithm-radicalizes-people/. 
36 J. M. Berger, “Nazis vs. ISIS on Twitter: A Comparative Study of White Nationalist and ISIS Online Social 
Media Networks,” Report (Center for Cyber & Homeland Security (GWU), September 1, 2016), 
https://apo.org.au/node/67247. 
37 Maura Conway, “Determining the Role of the Internet in Violent Extremism and Terrorism: Six Suggestions for 
Progressing Research,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 40, no. 1 (January 2017): 77–98, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1157408. 
38 Ibid.  
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the radical right utilizes social media tools and applications designed to increase online traffic 
and follower counts.39 Additionally, many white power websites manipulate algorithms to ensure 
their websites are among the first results produced by various web searches.40 The appearance of 
such websites at the top of search engine results provides a misleading sense of legitimacy and 
increased number of visitors to the sites.41 Tactics designed to expand outreach satisfy radical 
right social media strategies which rely primarily on ideological diffusion and replacement of 
standard worldviews.42  
 Virtual Violent Islamic Extremist (VIE) forums also hope to appeal to large global 
audiences. Many websites and social media accounts publish information in English rather than 
Arabic to expand potential viewership.43 Yet, VIE sites follow a different type of engagement 
strategy than that of the radical right. Instead of broad messaging campaigns, VIE sites tend to 
cultivate intimate, hierarchical online communities designed to radicalize potential recruits in a 
manner closer to traditional socialization.44  For instance, among ISIS accounts, “members of the 
recruiter social network flock around prospective recruits to provide a sense of supportive 
community; recruiters then isolate users from their pre-existing communities. This activity 
culminates in an effort to prompt recruits to take material steps in support of ISIS, such as 
 
39 J. M. Berger, “Nazis vs. ISIS on Twitter: A Comparative Study of White Nationalist and ISIS Online Social 
Media Networks,” Report (Center for Cyber & Homeland Security (GWU), September 1, 2016), 
https://apo.org.au/node/67247. 
40 Rishi Chebrolu, “The Racial Lens of Dylann Roof: Racial Anxiety and White Nationalist Rhetoric on New 
Media,” Review of Communication 20, no. 1 (January 2020): 56, https://doi.org/10.1080/15358593.2019.1708441. 
41 Ibid.  
42 J. M. Berger, “Nazis vs. ISIS on Twitter: A Comparative Study of White Nationalist and ISIS Online Social 
Media Networks,” Report (Center for Cyber & Homeland Security (GWU), September 1, 2016), 
https://apo.org.au/node/67247. 
43 Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens, Audrey Alexander, and Nick Kaderbhai, “The Impact of Digital 
Communications Technology on Radicalization and Recruitment,” International Affairs 93, no. 5 (September 1, 
2017): 1237, https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iix103. 
44 Ibid.  
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becoming a foreign fighter or carrying out a terrorist attack.”45 Some experts contend that these 
online communities may be attempts by VIE organizations to manipulate disenfranchised 
individuals in Western countries into committing smaller, but less logistically challenging, terror 
attacks.46 In essence, these organizations seek to crowdsource terror. 
 One way that extremist organizations ensure long-term exposure to radical online content 
is by “gamifying” their website experiences. This is done by applying game-like incentives in 
non-game settings.47 For example, al Qaeda (AQ) operates two web forums, al Shumukh and al-
Fida, both of which utilize a point-based system to encourage increased user engagement.48 
Point accrual allows individuals within the community to gain reputations, power, and legitimacy 
among other users on the sites. Stormfront introduced a similar scheme in which users gain status 
by posting to the RRE website.49 One author noted that, “Awlaki has used gamification to do 
what al Qaeda had been unable to do before him, at least in any systematic way: get Americans 
to compete with one another to put down their keyboards and pick up their weapons.”50 
Both VIE and radical right organizations are encountering online policing more 
frequently as sites like Twitter suspend the accounts of known radicals.51 Suspensions are often 
 
45 J. M. Berger, “Nazis vs. ISIS on Twitter: A Comparative Study of White Nationalist and ISIS Online Social 
Media Networks,” Report (Center for Cyber & Homeland Security (GWU), September 1, 2016): 20, 
https://apo.org.au/node/67247. 
46Robin Thompson, “Radicalization and the Use of Social Media,” Journal of Strategic Security 4, no. 4 (2011): 
167–90, http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.4.4.8; Jason Burke, “The Age of Selfie Jihad: How Evolving Media 
Technology Is Changing Terrorism,” Combating Terrorism Center Sentinel 9, no. 11 (November 30, 2016), 
https://ctc.usma.edu/the-age-of-selfie-jihad-how-evolving-media-technology-is-changing-terrorism/. 
47 Jarret Brachman and Alix Levine, “The World of Holy Warcraft,” Foreign Policy (blog), April 13, 2011, 
https://foreignpolicy-com.proxy1.library.jhu.edu/2011/04/13/the-world-of-holy-warcraft/. 
48 Thérèse Postel, “The Young and the Normless: Al Qaeda’s Ideological Recruitment of Western Extremists,” 
Connections 12, no. 4 (Fall 2013): 110. 
49 Jarret Brachman and Alix Levine, “The World of Holy Warcraft,” Foreign Policy (blog), April 13, 2011, 
https://foreignpolicy-com.proxy1.library.jhu.edu/2011/04/13/the-world-of-holy-warcraft/. 
50 Ibid.  
51 J M Berger and Heather Perez, “The Islamic State’s Diminishing Returns on Twitter: How Suspensions Are 




not permanent, however, as radicals have developed countermeasures to ensure continued 
presence on various platforms.52  Nonetheless, Berger and fellow researcher Heather Perez found 
that the long-term impacts caused by such deferments are interfering with extremist output.53 
Thus, many radicals are looking for new platforms upon which to build virtual followings. While 
platform and group-based studies are vital to understanding the impacts of online realities, there 
is too little information available exploring how individuals are affected by the various virtual 
campaigns. Therefore, this study addresses qualitatively how individuals engage with extremist 
material leading up to violent events to determine whether there is a difference in how different 
actors are radicalized and mobilized.  
Part II: Research Design  
Hypotheses 
The Literature Review examined existing comparative, quantitative research which found 
differences in the strategies utilized by radical groups online. VIE groups publish static materials 
(material designed for one-way consumption) aimed to inspire extremists, but also implement 
formalized recruitment schemes and escalatory radicalization. Previous research indicates that 
these organizations often aim to cultivate online breeding grounds and virtual communities. 54 
Conversely, RRE factions prefer to inundate web users with alternative information sources.55 
Past studies suggest these groups are more interested in propagating large amounts of radical 
material to replace conventional viewpoints than in fostering online communities. However, little 
empirical evidence exists determining the efficacy of these techniques from the standpoint of the 
 
52 J M Berger and Heather Perez, “The Islamic State’s Diminishing Returns on Twitter: How Suspensions Are 
Limiting Social Networks of English-Speaking ISIS Supporters” (George Washington University, February 2016), 
https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs2191/f/downloads/JMB%20Diminishing%20Returns.pdf. 
53 Ibid.  
54 Ibid.  
55 Ibid.  
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extremist. Thus, a crucial research question emerges: do different types of extremist actors 
demonstrate distinct radicalization behaviors online in conjunction with the strategies 
implemented by ideologically aligned organizations? Or are internet-based aspects of 
radicalization similar across radical typology despite the distinctive mobilization strategies 
utilized by different extremist groups?  
This exploratory study sought to qualitatively understand the phenomenon of how the 
internet influences the radicalization process of different types of violent extremist actors. It did 
not intend to establish causality of online radicalization nor did it attempt to understand why the 
internet influences different types of actors in distinct ways, as there is no evidence that such 
discrepancy exists at the actor level. Instead, it aimed to discover the actor experience during the 
online radicalization process by assessing if internet behaviors are similar by actor type. Due to 
the distinct online strategies utilized by different types of extremist groups, this researcher 
hypothesized that various types of subjects would display distinct behavioral patterns. This was 
reflected by the following hypothesis and sub-hypotheses:  
H1: Different types of violent extremists demonstrate unique online behaviors 
throughout individual radicalization.  
H1(a): Radical Right Extremists (RREs) are primarily one-way consumers of 
extremist content and contribute little original thought.   
H1(b): Violent Islamic Extremists (VIEs) participate in interactive online 
communications and become active members of virtual communities.  
 
The hypotheses expected results to show at least partial online radicalization in the 
selected case studies. However, results were anticipated to reveal differences in actor 
engagement with online material (H1). Specifically, the study considered RREs to be less likely 
to partake in two-way virtual interactions, either for the purposes of ideological socialization or 
logistical planning (H1a). Instead, H1a posited that RREs were more apt to absorb mass amounts 
14 
 
of radical propaganda while only publicly publishing pre-attack manifestos online since RRE 
organizations demonstrate little activity in building web-based communities. Conversely, 
Literature Review findings suggest formal VIE organizations attempt to cultivate virtual 
breeding groups that mimic traditional radicalization. As such, H1b expected that VIEs 
participate in virtual idea exchanges, mentorship programs, and operation planning – often with 
known terrorist organizations. Unexpected results included cases with little or no web-based 
radicalization, instances in which RREs maintained vocal online presences, and examples in 
which VIEs absorbed ideological material while abstaining from virtual socialization.  
Methodology 
To test these hypotheses, this research compared the internet-based radicalization of VIEs 
and RREs in the United States through a cross-case analysis.56 The project analyzed three 
instances of each case type, looking for common trends within the radicalization processes of 
both groups. Sample cases were identified in the START Global Terrorism Database (GTD) and 
selected based upon available data.57 Further, sample selection considered most similar cases in 
an effort to control external variables.58 Thus, the research examined individual and partner 
attacks since they are less likely to have experienced formal, in-person socialization and more 
likely to have radicalized – at least in part – online. Additionally, to ensure sample similarities, 
only instances in which fatalities occurred were analyzed. Finally, each case considered for this 
study occurred between 2010 and 2019. The small timeframe accounts for the rise of most 
prominent social media platforms and most relevant technological advances. Data occurring after 
2019 was excluded from the study due to potential behavioral changes caused by the pandemic.  
 
56 John W. Creswell, Qualitative Inquiry & Research Design: Choosing among Five Approaches, 2nd ed (Thousand 
Oaks: Sage Publications, 2007): 75. 
57 “GTD | Global Terrorism Database,” accessed February 15, 2021, https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/. 
58 Jason Seawright and John Gerring, “Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research: A Menu of Qualitative 
and Quantitative Options,” Political Research Quarterly 61, no. 2 (June 1, 2008): 294–308. 
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 This study examined the nexus of two variables. One variable considered the type of 
actor. The research defined VIE actors will be any militant inspired by extreme Islamic ideology 
and jihad. The radical right is more ambiguous as it includes multiple distinct ideologies. For this 
study RRE actors were constrained to those showing white supremacist, white nationalist, or 
neo-Nazi motivations. The second variable in this study examined various web-based behaviors. 
To operationalize this variable, specific trends were pulled from the literature review and the 
case narratives then categorized as either one-way absorption of extremist material or two-way 
socialization or radical content. Specifically, participation with a virtual community (e.g., 
interactive forums, gaming, social media communities), mentorship with a formal organization, 
solicitation of planning assistance, socialization of ideas through public or posted messages, and 
socialization of ideas through private messages were all deemed to be interactive behaviors. 
Meanwhile, absorption of one-way content (e.g., videos, lectures, written materials, static 
websites), pledges to unaffiliated groups, individual target and planning behaviors were coded as 
non-social internet utilizations. Variables were tracked in individual tables at the end of each 
case study in Part III of the study.  
The following case studies are written in a narrative format with a primary focus on the 
violent actor’s internet-based radicalization. Background information and evidence of in-person 
socialization was included in cases as necessary. All data was mined through a mixture of first 
and secondary sources, including: media reports, court documents, press releases, interview 
transcripts, congressional hearings, scholarly articles, manifestos, and social media records.  
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Part III: Data 
Violent Islamic Extremists 
VIE Case Study I: Omar Mateen 
On June 12th, 2016, Omar Mateen carried out an attack at the Pulse nightclub in Orlando, 
Florida, killing 49 and injuring 53 more.59 Mateen credited ISIS with the attack, pledging his 
allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi amid the violence.60 However, investigators uncovered no 
evidence of a formal connection between the perpetrator and the organization; instead, they 
found an individual who mostly self-radicalized.61 Omar Mateen was known to authorities prior 
to the Orlando attack. He was first investigated after claiming affiliation to a known terrorist 
organization and again in connection to a known foreign fighter.62 Despite this, Omar Mateen’s 
quiet radicalization continued undetected by authorities.  
 Reports note that Omar Mateen had active profiles on Facebook and MySpace and 
operated several email accounts.63 Additionally, some speculation indicates that he may have 
created accounts on gay dating apps, although no corroborating evidence was ever released by 
investigative agencies.64 In any case, Mateen maintained an active social media presence, having 
 
59 Joe Whittaker, “Online Radicalization, The West, and The ‘Web 2.0’: A Case Study Analysis,” in Countering 
Terrorist Activities in Cyberspace, ed. Z. Minchev and M. Bogdanoski (Amsterdam, NETHERLANDS, THE: IOS 
Press, Incorporated, 2018), http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/jhu/detail.action?docID=5435937. 
60 Andrea Aprea, “Investigative Update Regarding Pulse Nightclub Shooting — FBI,” Press Release, June 20, 2016, 
https://www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field-offices/tampa/news/press-releases/investigative-update-regarding-pulse-
nightclub-shooting. 
61 Jeffrey Kluger, “This Is What Drove the Orlando Killer,” Time, June 14, 2016, https://time.com/4368275/mateen-
orlando-why-he-killed/. 
62 Mark Mazzetti, Eric Lichtblau, and Alan Blinder, “Omar Mateen, Twice Scrutinized by F.B.I., Shows Threat of 
Lone Terrorists,” The New York Times, June 14, 2016, sec. U.S., 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/14/us/politics/orlando-shooting-omar-mateen.html. 
63 “Omar Mateen,” Counter Extremism Project, June 13, 2016, 
https://www.counterextremism.com/extremists/omar-mateen. 
64 Joe Whittaker, “Online Radicalization, The West, and The ‘Web 2.0’: A Case Study Analysis,” in Countering 
Terrorist Activities in Cyberspace, ed. Z. Minchev and M. Bogdanoski (Amsterdam, NETHERLANDS, THE: IOS 
Press, Incorporated, 2018), http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/jhu/detail.action?docID=5435937. 
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met his first wife on MySpace in 2008.65 He was also a frequent Facebook user, utilizing the 
platform as both a social tool and a search engine.66 A letter from Senator Ron Johnson to 
Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg indicates that Mateen may have operated multiple Facebook 
accounts in his search for ideological materials.67 It appears his searches, both through social 
media and more conventional search engines, primarily focused on ISIS propaganda, the Boston 
Bombings, and the 2015 San Bernardino attack.68 However, his internet musings were 
discordant, conflicting, and largely incoherent. One researcher noted that, 
 “As Mateen ‘read up’ the contents of the internet's vast data reservoir, he did not 
decode its information through a grand narrative of Wahhabism, Khomeinism, or 
some mainline practice of American Islam (reports indicate he was somewhat 
dislocated from his own religious community) but rather through his own 
affective tendencies toward fantasies of violence and power.”69  
 
He did not engage in virtual communities nor seek increasingly religious teachings.70 
Rather, he absorbed extremist messaging and narratives found in ISIS propaganda.71 As Seamus 
Hughes, Deputy Director of George Washington University’s Program on Extremism noted, 
 
65 Mark Mazzetti, Eric Lichtblau, and Alan Blinder, “Omar Mateen, Twice Scrutinized by F.B.I., Shows Threat of 
Lone Terrorists,” The New York Times, June 14, 2016, sec. U.S., 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/14/us/politics/orlando-shooting-omar-mateen.html. 
66 Alan Blinder, Frances Robles, and Richard Pérez-Peña, “Facebook Asked to Provide Details of Gunman’s 
Postings,” The New York Times, June 16, 2016, sec. U.S., 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/06/16/us/document-JohnsonFacebookletter-2.html. 
67 Ibid.  
68 Kevin Sullivan et al., “Orlando Shooter Posted Messages on Facebook Pledging Allegiance to the Leader of ISIS 
and Vowing More Attacks,” Washington Post, June 15, 2016, sec. National Security, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/investigation-into-orlando-shooting-continues-no-
impending-charges-expected/2016/06/15/c3eccf5e-3333-11e6-8758-d58e76e11b12_story.html. 
69 Brian Hughes, “A Lone Wolf in the Hypertext: Radicalization Online,” 21st Century Global Dynamics 10, no. 52 
(August 7, 2017), https://www.21global.ucsb.edu/global-e/august-2017/lone-wolf-hypertext-radicalization-online. 
70 Ibid.  
71 Dan Frosch and Nicole Hong, “Transcripts Show ISIS Influence on Orlando Gunman,” The Wall Street Journal, 




Mateen’s stated grievances regarding U.S. airstrikes in the Middle East and the killing of Abu 
Wahib reflected an avid consumption of ISIS messaging.72   
 Despite Mateen’s intake of extremist materials, he partook in very little virtual 
socialization throughout his radicalization process. Authorities found that he had spent years 
searching for and viewing ideological propaganda, primarily in the form of radical videos, such 
as when he conducted a June 4th, 2016 search for speeches by ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-
Baghdadi.73 Yet, Mateen never engaged with the online ISIS community. He did not have a 
mentor or socialize with any like-minded users.74 It appears that the majority of his online 
extremist rhetoric was posted throughout the attack on Pulse nightclub, during which time he 
published several messages in support of the Islamic State.75 It does not appear that Mateen 
utilized any online sources to plan the attack, aside from Google searches for nightclubs in 
Orlando on the night of the attack.76 In total, Omar Mateen did not have a virtual community, 
was not engaged in an internet echo chamber, and showed no signs of soliciting online planning 
 
72 Dan Frosch and Nicole Hong, “Transcripts Show ISIS Influence on Orlando Gunman,” The Wall Street Journal, 
September 27, 2016, sec. U.S., https://www.wsj.com/articles/transcripts-show-isis-influence-on-orlando-gunman-
1475023090. 
73
 Kevin Sullivan et al., “Orlando Shooter Posted Messages on Facebook Pledging Allegiance to the Leader of ISIS 
and Vowing More Attacks,” Washington Post, June 15, 2016, sec. National Security, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/investigation-into-orlando-shooting-continues-no-
impending-charges-expected/2016/06/15/c3eccf5e-3333-11e6-8758-d58e76e11b12_story.html; Kevin Sullivan et 
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Attacks,” Washington Post, June 15, 2016, sec. National Security, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
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74 Joe Whittaker, “Online Radicalization, The West, and The ‘Web 2.0’: A Case Study Analysis,” in Countering 
Terrorist Activities in Cyberspace, ed. Z. Minchev and M. Bogdanoski (Amsterdam, NETHERLANDS, THE: IOS 
Press, Incorporated, 2018), http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/jhu/detail.action?docID=5435937. 
75 Alan Blinder, Frances Robles, and Richard Pérez-Peña, “Facebook Asked to Provide Details of Gunman’s 
Postings,” The New York Times, June 16, 2016, sec. U.S., 
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assistance. His radicalization included almost no web-based socialization aside from 
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VIE Case Study II: Syad Rizwan Farook & Tashfeen Malik 
 Syad Rizwan Farook and his wife, Tashfeen Malik, attacked a Christmas party at 
Farook’s place of work on December 2nd, 2015 in San Bernardino, California.77 The couple 
reportedly attempted to continue the rampage in the surrounding area with Improvised Explosive 
Devices (IEDs) that ultimately failed to detonate.78 The preparators credited the attack, which 
killed 14 and injured 22, to the Islamic State, though no formal connection was ever 
established.79 Examination of the case suggests that the radicalization of Farook and Malik 
started separately and occurred both in-person and online.  
 Farook’s radicalization began with an accomplice, prior to meeting Malik. Farook, who 
was born in the United States to Pakistani parents, introduced his younger neighbor, Enrique 
Marquez, to Islam in the mid-2000s.80 It is through related case files from an investigation into 
Marquez, not Farook, that much of their radicalization was revealed to authorities. The FBI 
found that the two men experimented with increasingly radical forms of Islam after Marquez’s 
 
77 John Roth, “MEMORANDUM: December 3, 2015 - San Bernardino Incident” (Office of Inspector General 
Department of Homeland Security, June 1, 2016), 
https://www.hsdl.org/?search=&searchfield=&all=%22san+bernardino%22+shooting&collection=documents&sub
mitted=Search. 
78 Joel T. Anderson, United States of America v. Enrique Marquez, Jr., No. 5:15MJ498 (United States District Court 
for the Central District of California Date 2015). 
79 James B. Comey, “Federal Bureau of Investigation Oversight | C-SPAN.Org” (2015), https://www.c-
span.org/video/?401606-1/fbi-director-james-comey-oversight-hearing-testimony. 
80 William Finnegan, “Last Days,” New Yorker 92, no. 2 (February 22, 2016): 50–59. 
Table 1: Variables Displayed by Omar Mateen 
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initial conversion to Islam.81 By the late 2000s, Marquez was accessing extremist materials 
online, presumably with the help of Farook.82 This material included Anwar al-Awlaki’s lecture, 
“The Hereafter,” and the teachings of Imran Hosein, a scholar who espoused support of Sharia-
based commune.83 According to FBI documents,  
“Marquez spent most of his time at Farook’s residence, where he read, listened to 
lectures, and watched videos involving radical Islam content, including Inspire 
Magazine, the official publication of AQAP, ‘Defense of Muslim Lands,’ by 
Shaikh Abdullah Azzam, and videos produced by Al-Shabbab, Al-Qa’ida’s 
affiliate in Somalia.”84 
 
Around 2012, the two men planned and prepared to carry out a two-pronged attack in 
which they intended to target Riverside Community College and State Route 91.85 The duo 
utilized information found in AQ’s Inspire Magazine to prepare for the attack.86 However, 
Marquez disengaged from the plan and the incident was never perpetrated.87   
 Marquez was integral in Farook’s radicalization as an audience upon which he could 
socialize radical narratives; however, Farook’s radicalization expanded beyond his friendship 
with the younger man. Farook’s internet history suggests he was interested in finding a Muslim 
wife of Middle Eastern or South Asian descent.88 Reportedly, he joined Dubaimatrimonial.com 
where he created a profile describing himself as a modern man with a blend of Eastern and 
Western values.89 However, Farook’s dating profiles suggest the reality of his increasingly 
 
81 William Finnegan, “Last Days,” New Yorker 92, no. 2 (February 22, 2016): 52. 
82 Joel T. Anderson, United States of America v. Enrique Marquez, Jr., No. 5:15MJ498 (United States District Court 
for the Central District of California Date 2015). 
83 Ibid: 7.  
84 Joel T. Anderson, United States of America v. Enrique Marquez, Jr., No. 5:15MJ498 (United States District Court 
for the Central District of California Date 2015): 8. 
85 Ibid: 11.  
86 Ibid: 25.  
87 William Finnegan, “Last Days,” New Yorker 92, no. 2 (February 22, 2016): 53. 
88 Ibid, 55.  
89 Ibid.  
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radical faith. Specifically, he later joined a second site, BestMuslim.com, where he described 
himself as an ardent student of the Quran looking to find a devout wife.90 There he met and 
exchanged radical ideas about jihad and martyrdom with Tashfeen Malik.91 
 Little is known about Tashfeen Malik aside from a few sporadic communications she 
made on social media. Malik was known to strictly follow the conservative guidelines of 
Wahhabism despite having been raised in a moderate Sufi family in Pakistan.92 As such, early 
acquaintances remembered her as a gregarious with modern values.93 However, as she adopted 
more fundamentalist views of Islam, she became more isolated, later communicating only with 
those inside of her immediate circle of trusted friends.94 After leaving Pakistan, Malik moved to 
Saudi Arabia with her parents where she received a degree in pharmacology and subsequently 
studied the Quran at a conservative madrassa.95 Her social media presence was limited, secure, 
and hard to access by anyone outside of a select group of online friends.96 What was accessible 
indicated that she radicalized prior to immigrating to the United States.97 She operated a 
Facebook account under the pseudonym Larki Zaat, which is Urdu for “girl with no name.”98 
The account revealed at least two messages in which she told friends in Pakistan that she hoped 
to partake in jihad.99 Additionally, one of her first posts upon coming to America was the ISIS 
 
90 William Finnegan, “Last Days,” New Yorker 92, no. 2 (February 22, 2016): 55. 
91 James B. Comey, “Federal Bureau of Investigation Oversight” (2015), https://www.c-span.org/video/?401606-
1/fbi-director-james-comey-oversight-hearing-testimony. 
92 William Finnegan, “Last Days,” New Yorker 92, no. 2 (February 22, 2016): 55. 
93 Pat St. Claire, Greg Botelho, and Ralph Ellis, “San Bernardino Shooter Tashfeen Malik: Who Was She?,” CNN, 
December 6, 2015, https://www.cnn.com/2015/12/06/us/san-bernardino-shooter-tashfeen-malik/index.html. 
94 William Finnegan, “Last Days,” New Yorker 92, no. 2 (February 22, 2016): 56. 
95 Ibid, 55.  
96 Evan Perez and Dana Ford, “San Bernardino Shooter’s Social Media Posts on Jihad Were Obscured,” CNN, 
December 14, 2015, https://www.cnn.com/2015/12/14/us/san-bernardino-shooting/index.html. 
97 James B. Comey, “Federal Bureau of Investigation Oversight” (2015), https://www.c-span.org/video/?401606-
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98 William Finnegan, “Last Days,” New Yorker 92, no. 2 (February 22, 2016): 56. 
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slur, “woe to coconut Muslims,” which was a reference to “Muslims who were, by her lights, 
insufficiently militant.”100 
 There is less information available about the couple’s internet usage and search history 
over the course of Farook and Malik’s short marriage. Investigators found destroyed technology 
in the couple’s home but were only able to garner a small amount of information from the 
recovered data.101 However, it appears that the IEDs created by Farook and Malik were 
consistent with the pipe bomb designs published in AQAP’s web-based periodical, Inspire.102 
Additionally, the San Bernardino Police Chief revealed that “[Malik] had essentially made the 
statement in an online account that she didn’t think that a Muslim should have to participate in a 
non-Muslim holiday or event” prior to the attack.103 An FBI affidavit reveals that at 8:43 am, just 
prior to the incident, Malik searched for information on ISIS and the terror organization’s 
leadership.104 After the attack, at 11:14am, Malik posted the following message to her Facebook 
page: “We pledge allegiance to Khalifa bu bkr al bhaghdadi al quraishi” – the leader of the ISIS 
they had searched earlier that day.105  
 Farook and Malik’s radicalization processes were complex and multi-faceted. They both 
evidently participated in periods of traditional, face-to-face socialization. Farook’s escalatory 
relationship with Marquez allowed him to blend virtual teachings with in-person planning. 
 
100 William Finnegan, “Last Days,” New Yorker 92, no. 2 (February 22, 2016): 56. 
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fbi.html. 
102 Joel T. Anderson, United States of America v. Enrique Marquez, Jr., No. 5:15MJ498 (United States District 
Court for the Central District of California Date 2015). 
103 Megan Christie et al., “Christmas Party May Have Triggered San Bernardino Terror Attack: Police,” ABC 
News, November 30, 2016, https://abcnews.go.com/US/christmas-party-triggered-san-bernardino-terror-attack-
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104 Joel T. Anderson, United States of America v. Enrique Marquez, Jr., No. 5:15MJ498 (United States District 
Court for the Central District of California Date 2015). 
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Although little is known of Malik’s exposure to and adoption of radical ideals, it can be 
reasonably presumed that husband and wife socialized further ideations during their marriage. 
However, there are several online features of the couple’s radicalization as well. Farook relied 
heavily on videos, lectures, and magazines published by formal terror organizations to create 
grievance narratives and plan attacks. Malik shared radical feelings with friends on hidden social 
media accounts. The couple utilized dating websites to share and socialize extremist ideas 
amongst themselves. Finally, the couple revealed motives and a last-minute accreditation to ISIS 
in online forums. Yet, despite the numerous influences the internet had on the couple’s 
radicalization, there was no discernable connection between Farook, Malik, and a formally 
defined terror network. They were not part of a larger radical community, nor was there evidence 
they followed social media accounts related to such efforts. They were not mentored or offered 
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VIE Case Study III: Tsarnaev Brothers 
 Brothers Tamerlan and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev were born in the Soviet Union and in present-
day Kyrgyzstan, respectively, to an ethnically Chechen family.106 In 2001, the brothers moved 
with their sisters and parents to Dagestan, a republic of Russia.107 In 2002 Dzhokhar, or Jahar to 
 
106 Janet Reitman, “Jahar: The Making of a Monster,” Rolling Stone (blog), July 17, 2013, 
https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-news/jahars-world-83856/. 
107 CNN Staff, “Timeline: A Look at Tamerlan Tsarnaev’s Past,” CNN, April 22, 2013, 
https://www.cnn.com/2013/04/21/us/tamerlan-tsarnaev-timeline/index.html. 
Table 2: Variables Displayed by Syad Rizwan Farook & Tashfeen Malik  
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his American friends, immigrated with his parents to the United States.108 Tamerlan and the 
sisters joined their family in Boston the following year.109 A decade later, on April 15th, 2013, 
the Tsarnaev brothers used IEDs to bomb the finish line of the Boston Marathon, killing three 
and injuring over 250.110 The rampage continued during their attempted escape, during which 
time they killed an additional victim.111 The decade between the brothers’ arrival in the United 
States and their ideologically-motivated killing spree shows the development of grievances and 
socialization of radical ideologies, both of which occurred in-person and in cyberspace.  
 Tamerlan Tsarnaev was the oldest son, which thanks to Chechen cultural norms, granted 
him increased influence within his family.112 His clout was heightened by his boxing prowess 
and his seemingly attainable dreams of becoming an Olympian.113 Yet, his time in the United 
States resulted in disappointment. As one analyst of the case noted, “Tamerlan Tsarnaev 
struggled with school, never fit into a social group, witnessed his parents’ divorce and return to 
Russia, and saw his Olympic dreams to box as an American crushed.”114 His increasing isolation 
and disillusionment resulted in erratic behaviors. Thus, under the guidance of his mother, 
Tamerlan turned to Islam to quell his growing discontent.115 Eventually, Mikhail “Mischa”      
Allakhverdov, a friend of the Tsarnaevs, began delivering private sermons to Tamerlan on Islam, 
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the Quran, and mystical aspects of the religion, in what may have been early ideological 
socialization.116 Interestingly, while Tamerlan was becoming a progressively more devout 
Muslim, he was also consuming RRE literature including newsletters by The American Free 
Press and The First Freedom – publications with anti-Semitic and white supremacist leanings.117 
Paradoxically, he was simultaneously exploring conspiracy sites like Alex Jones’s InfoWars and 
consuming Salafi online extremist propaganda.118 By 2009, he was openly espousing radical 
ideologies to family and friends.119  
Tamerlan’s radicalization was flagrant enough to draw the attention of authorities in early 
2011 when Russia requested the FBI’s assistance in investigating his potential to become an 
Islamic foreign fighter.120 However, FBI did not find that Tsarnaev presented a credible threat 
and closed the investigation.121 In 2012, Tamerlan traveled to Russia with the intent to join a 
group of Chechen rebels.122 This was likely influenced by a virtual connection he made with 
William Plotnikov – a similarly disillusioned Russian immigrant in Canada who returned to fight 
with militants in Dagestan.123 However, while there, a cousin criticized Tamerlan’s usefulness to 
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the rebellion, which seemingly reoriented Tsarnaev’s objective toward global jihad rather than 
regional insurgency.124 
 Not much is known about Tamerlan’s six-month stint in Dagestan, but it is likely he 
further socialized his radical ideologies among the extremists with whom he interacted. Upon his 
return, Tamerlan posted multiple radical uploads to a YouTube page. These included videos 
featuring Imarat Kavkaz – a prominent militant Islamist group in the north Caucasus  – , and 
AQ’s “The Emergence of Prophecy: The Black Flags from Khorasan.”125 Additionally, he 
created an encrypted file on his computer with images of suffering Muslims and quotes 
promoting jihad.126 His return to the United States prompted Tamerlan to engage Jahar in 
socialization of radical beliefs, encouraging his younger brother to commit more strongly to 
Islam and fostering his consumption of extremist materials.  
Jahar Tsarnaev adjusted much more naturally to American life than his older brother. He 
had friends, did well in school, and was a successful athlete.127 However, his transition from high 
school to college occurred during a period of intense family turmoil and he seemingly lost his 
sense of direction.128 During this time, Tamerlan was Jahar’s only local family and exerted 
significant influence over the younger Tsarnaev.129 Jahar frequently received extremist material 
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from his brother, including lectures by Anwar Al-Awlaki such as “The Hereafter”.130 Other 
radical propaganda was also found on the younger Tsarnaev’s computer, including:  a digital 
book entitled “The Slicing Sword, Against the One Who Forms Allegiances With the Disbelievers 
and Takes Them as Supporters Instead of Allah, His Messenger and The Believers;” propaganda 
from jihadist leader Abdullah Azzam entitled “Defense of the Muslim Lands, the First Obligation 
After Imam;” and a piece titled “Jihad and Effects of Intention Upon It,” among others.131 
Finally, he had electronic content from Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s (AQAP’s) Inspire 
magazine, which the brothers used to prepare for the attack. One article found in Jahar’s files 
was “How to Make a Bomb in the Kitchen of Your Mom,” from which the brothers gleaned their 
knowledge of how to create the IEDs utilized in the attack.132  Despite Jahar’s consumption of 
radical materials, few who knew him were aware that he harbored extremist ideations. 
Unlike Tamerlan, Jahar did not widely promote extremist rhetoric in-person or online. A 
single conversation with a friend hinted at his disdain and disbelief regarding the September 11th 
terrorist attacks.133 Some analysts considered this episode to be an accidental slip rather than a 
case of socialization, since Jahar quickly reverted to his well-adjusted façade rather than 
justifying his views.134 He also discussed the possibility of striving to reach Jannah – or paradise 
– with a friend via text.135 His online presence also appeared innocuous at first, but in hindsight 
 
130 Ann O’Neill, “Dzhokhar Tsarnaev Trial: The Radicalization of Jahar,” CNN, March 30, 2015, 
https://www.cnn.com/2015/03/27/us/tsarnaev-13th-juror-jahar-radicalization/index.html. 
131United States of America v. Dzhokhar A. Tsarnaev, a/k/a "Jahar Tsarni, Defendant., No. 1:13CR10200GAO 
(United States District Court District of Massachusetts June 27, 2013). 
132 Thérèse Postel, “The Young and the Normless: Al Qaeda’s Ideological Recruitment of Western Extremists,” 
Connections 12, no. 4 (Fall 2013): 114. 
133 Janet Reitman, “Jahar: The Making of a Monster,” Rolling Stone (blog), July 17, 2013, 
https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-news/jahars-world-83856/. 
134 Ibid.  




reveals potential hints to Jahar’s darker desires. The younger Tsarnaev had profiles on Facebook, 
Twitter, and VKontakte (a Russian social media website).136 Between mundane posts he would 
include comments such as “a decade in America already, I want out,” and “never underestimate a 
rebel with a cause.”137 One post, dated about a year before the attack, declared in Russian, “I will 
die young.”138 However, investigators uncovered a second Twitter account also utilized by Jahar. 
This one, with the handle @Al_firdausiA, was where Jahar published more blatantly extreme 
comments, including one in which he encouraged his followers to follow the teachings of Anwar 
Al-Awlaki.139  
The radicalization processes of the Tsarnaev brothers were different but interconnected. 
Tamerlan utilized the internet to assuage isolation and purposelessness. He found virtual 
communities among both VIE and RRE forums. He consumed copious amounts of propaganda 
and formed friendships with other radicals online. His only engagement with a formal militant 
organization seems to have occurred in-person during his visit to Dagestan. Upon his return he 
engaged in public and private two-way interaction with extremist material. Meanwhile, Jahar 
was likely introduced to VIE ideology through Tamerlan. He similarly consumed VIE 
propaganda and socialized his radical thoughts online. Jahar wrote a manifesto while hiding from 
law enforcement after the attack; however, he never published it to the internet so it could not be 
included in this study. The brothers utilized AQAP’s Inspire magazine as a planning resource but 
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Radical Right Extremists 
RRE Case Study I: Dylann Roof 
 One June 17th, 2015, Dylann Roof traveled to Charleston, South Carolina and targeted 
members of the Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church – one of the country’s oldest 
historically Black churches – in a hate crime and terrorist attack.140 Roof joined a small evening 
prayer meeting before killing nine members of the congregation and injuring one.141 Roof’s 
primary goal was to incite a race war in the United States, an objective he cultivated primarily 
online.142  
Dylann Roof was a socially awkward youth with multiple untreated mental disorders that 
contributed to his radicalization.143 He began failing classes and dropped out of high school after 
his first year, choosing instead to take GED classes online.144 Roof completely isolated himself 
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after dropping out of high school. Apparently, he slept throughout the day and stayed awake all 
night.145 His sister estimated that he spent about five years in near total isolation, with the 
internet as his only connection to the outside world.146 Reportedly, Roof spent upwards of eight 
hours online each day until his mother eventually disconnected the internet to force external 
interaction.147  
While in isolation, Roof developed an interest in the Trayvon Martin case.148 He was 
unable to understand the outrage over Zimmerman’s actions as he read the Wikipedia article on 
the case, thus creating a cognitive opening.149 In Roof’s own words, “the event that truly 
awakened me was the Trayvon Martin case” which, “prompted me to type in the words 'black on 
White crime' into Google, and I have never been the same since that day."150 The first result that 
appeared on his search was a website run by the Council of Conservative Citizens, a group 
recognized as a white supremacist organization.151 To Roof, the top placement of the website 
within the hierarchical Google search granted the source an innate legitimacy.152  In fact, he 
never questioned the information he absorbed from the site since the claims fit his developing 
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grievance narrative. Rather, he suspected the traditional media, mentally delegitimizing 
platforms outside of the Council of Conservative Citizens, Stormfront, The Daily Stormer, and 
other known radical websites.153 His reliance on such websites took him down an extremist 
rabbit hole and his lack of external, mediating influences allowed him to exist within an isolated 
echo chamber.  
 Many sources depict Roof’s radicalization as a one-way absorption of radical material.154 
His defense attorney suggested “He [was] simply regurgitating, in whole paragraphs, slogans and 
facts—bits and pieces of facts that he downloaded from the internet directly into his brain.”155 
However, there is some evidence that he attempted to socialize his radical ideations virtually. 
First, Roof was present in radical forums and operated accounts with pseudonyms like 
LilAryan.156 One source noted that Roof bragged on Stormfront forums about his “well versed” 
knowledge of racism.157 Second, Roof posted a query on Craigslist which may be viewed as 
soliciting assistance during the planning portion leading up to the attack.  Specifically, he hoped 
to find a companion to take him on a tour of Charleston and point out prominent black historical 
sites.158 In the post he crudely stated that he had no intention of hiring minorities to assist him.159 
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Third, Roof appears to have deliberately maintained 88 friends on Facebook in a tribute to white 
power movements.160 88 is a significant number as it represents the numerical code for HH or 
“Heil Hitler.”161 Finally, Roof published many of his ideations in a personal blog titled the 
lastrhodesian.com, a title that signified his support for the Rhodesian apartheid-era 
government.162  
 Roof’s website was full of radical symbology and hateful rhetoric. The homepage of his 
website featured a still from a 1992 Australian film about neo-Nazis, Romper Stomper.163 The 
homepage also contained links for either “Images” or “Text.” The image file led to sixty pictures 
of Dylann Roof displaying various radical symbols or threatening behaviors.164 The photos often 
showed him wearing or holding the Confederate and Apartheid-era South African flags, holding 
various firearms, and burning the U.S. flag.165 In other pictures he is seen posing with wax 
figurines of slaves or posing with depictions of the number 1488 – another white power 
symbol.166 The text portion of his website led to a document labeled “rtf88,” his hastily created 
manifesto.167 In it, Roof detailed his initial cognitive opening and espoused radical grievance 
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narratives against multiple minority groups.168 While Roof’s manifesto was likely meant to be a 
final act, he ultimately engaged the larger RRE community with Stormfront Italia contacting him 
and asking him to lead a new neo-Nazi sect.169  
 Roof’s extreme isolation and escalating mental disorders made him susceptible to online 
radicalization. The online presence of the RRE movement provided him an accessible 
community through which he could socialize despite his isolation. A psychological assessment 
of Roof noted that “Based on his own statements (in the journal and during his FBI interview) it 
appears that Mr. Roof formed his racial ideas entirely as a result of online interaction.”170 
According to Roof, the internet provided him a racial awakening in which he finally understood 
what he believed to be “the truth.”171 Yet, there is some uncertainty as to how he utilized the 
internet. Analysis suggests that “it appears his interaction was mostly one-way; in other words, 
he read quite a lot but contributed little original thought.”172 It is conceivable that he simply 
absorbed the mass amounts of extremist material with little reciprocal engagement. However, 
some reports indicate that he did partake in interactive, web-based forums. Additionally, his 
attempt to obtain assistance from Craigslist and his ideation-signaling on Facebook indicates 
some experimentation with public virtual socialization of his radical ideals. Finally, his 
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RRE Case Study II: Nikolas Cruz 
 On February 14th, 2018, Nikolas Cruz ordered an Uber which took him to Marjory 
Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland, Florida. There, he murdered 17 former schoolmates 
and staff members and injured an additional 17 victims.173 Cruz’s rampage was classified as a 
terrorist event by the GTD rather than a non-ideological school shooting because he 
demonstrated characteristics of white supremacist and possible neo-Nazi leanings.174 This is 
further supported by reports which indicate Cruz had etched swastikas onto the magazines of 
ammunition he used in the attack.175  It appears that much of Cruz’s radicalization occurred with 
the help of the internet, although he did little to disguise his intent either on or offline.  
 Cruz and his biological half-brother were adopted together in childhood. Their adoptive 
father died when the boys were young, and their adoptive mother passed away in late 2017.176 
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Upon their mother’s death, the brothers were separated and living in different households.177 
Cruz displayed symptoms of undiagnosed mental disorders and he struggled to make friends. 
The internet became his primary social outlet. Cruz and several individuals belonged to a private 
Instagram group chat named “Murica (American flag emoji) (eagle emoji) great.”178 The group 
shared racist memes and videos and exchanged hundreds of messages including escalatory racist, 
misogynistic, and homophobic slurs.179 Interestingly, Cruz’s family was racially diverse: his 
adoptive father was Hispanic and his brother was likely half Black.180 Yet, this did not stop Cruz 
from stating his desire to kill minority groups in his private messages.181 Although the group 
largely did not support nor believe his murderous intent, he did inform them of his various 
preparatory purchases including body armor and weaponry.182  
 Cruz’s radical and deviant commentary was not limited to private group chats. He 
publicly displayed hate symbols and published indicators of his radical ideologies online.183 Cruz 
used multiple social media platforms including a since-deleted Facebook account.184 Cruz 
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possessed two Instagram accounts. One was private but showed him wearing a MAGA hat in the 
profile picture and describing himself with a single, telling descriptor in his biography: 
“annihilator.”185 Cruz’s other Instagram profile was public before the social media platform 
deleted his account.186 His accounts focused heavily on his arsenal, which included both guns 
and knives.187 Additionally, he posted photos and comments in which he discussed killing small 
animals.188 While many of Cruz’s posts did not directly reflect his radical beliefs, they 
demonstrated a consistent and concerning pattern of potentially deviant behavior that went 
unchecked – even when brought to the attention of authorities. For instance, a video in which 
Cruz cuts himself and discusses his desire to purchase firearms was uploaded to Snapchat in 
September 2016.189 This led to both an investigation and a wellness check, but little was done to 
intervene despite his increasingly erratic behavior.190 Unfortunately, this was only one of many 
incidents in which authorities were alerted to the potential risk Cruz posed, yet failed to 
intercede.  
 Over the years, law enforcement received at least twenty-three calls regarding Cruz’s 
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potential to become a school shooter.191  Many early calls came from Cruz’s mother who 
struggled to manage his angry, violent outbursts.192 In February 2016, months prior to the call 
prompted by the disturbing Snapchat video, a neighbor contacted authorities after seeing a social 
media post in which Cruz stated he wanted to turn eighteen so he could buy a gun and attack his 
school.193 Then, in September 2017, YouTuber Ben Bennington notified the FBI when an 
individual with the username “Nikolas Cruz” commented on one of his videos saying, “I'm going 
to be a professional school shooter.”194 The FBI noted that it received both this tip and a second 
in January 2018 that it failed to follow up on.195 The second tipster was aware of both his mental 
status and his stockpile of weapons, warning the law enforcement agency that he could become a 
school shooter.196 Between the two incidents reported to the FBI, there was one more report 
made to the Broward County Sheriff’s office indicating that Cruz had posted social media 
comments in which he expressed suicidal ideations.197  
 Cruz’s internet presence showed a unique blend of radical ideologies and deviant 
behavior. Privately, he discussed racist and radical far-right values in a small virtual community 
that he cultivated online. There he viewed and shared increasingly extreme materials. 
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Interestingly, he did not subscribe to well-known RRE websites, nor did he belong to any white 
supremacist organizations despite early reports to the contrary.198 Initially, the white supremacist 
group Republic of Florida (ROF) claimed credit for the attack, but no connection was ultimately 
found between Cruz and the RRE organization.199 Publicly, Cruz published some of his hate-
fueled ideations online. However, the accessible internet forums served as a platform for him to 
socialize deviant cognitions more so than extremist ideas. He did not attempt to solicit assistance 
or planning guidance online nor did he attribute the massacre to any group despite ROF’s desire 
to claim him. Finally, Cruz recorded a series of videos in which he discussed his intent in the 
days leading up to the shooting. In them, he states both his grievances and his plan for the 
attack.200 However, the videos were found on Cruz’s cellphone and were not published online, 
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RRE Case Study III: Patrick Crusius 
 Patrick Crusius grew up in an affluent suburb of Dallas, Texas, where he reportedly had a 
normal childhood.201 Crusius was described as a loner by many who knew him but never 
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displayed concerning behaviors or indicators of radicalization.202 In fact, he was a registered 
Republican whose politics appeared within the mainstream when he discussed issues within his 
family.203 Yet, on August 3, 2019, he drove 10 hours to a Walmart in El Paso, Texas where he 
murdered 22 and injured 26 victims.204 Crusius’s rampage killing was racially and politically 
motivated, and, as he told investigators, entirely mobilized by online factors.205  
 Crusius was aimless and lonely, making virtual communities particularly appealing. On 
his LinkedIn profile, Crusius described himself as unmotivated and largely talentless and as 
routinely spending eight hours a day online.”206 He possessed social media accounts on several 
mainstream platforms, such as Twitter and Instagram, but each profile had been inactive for 
years prior to the attack.207 Instead, the majority of his web-based socialization occurred on 
8chan which is an online forum that has become a haven for radicals due to lax usership rules.208 
8chan became popular with fringe groups when 4chan —another website frequented by 
radicals— began censoring certain extreme agendas.209 Crusius was exposed to white      
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supremacist ideologies through 8chan and basic internet searches. He claimed he never had 
direct contact with any white nationalists nor formal white power organizations.210 Instead, his 
biggest inspiration was Brenton Tarrant’s VIE manifesto, released just prior to Tarrant’s 
shooting spree in Christchurch, New Zealand.211 Although there were ideological differences 
between the two shooters, Crusius praised the message of Tarrant’s ideals in the former’s web-
based manifesto.212 
 Just prior to the attack, Crusius uploaded a manifesto to 8chan that outlined both his 
intentions and his grievances.213 At 10:15am an anonymous user uploaded two documents to 
8chan’s /pol/, or “politically incorrect,” discussion board.214 This specific discussion board had 
previously been used as a broadcasting location for other violent extremists due to the anonymity 
it provided and the hate speech it consistently hosted.215 Further, commentators on the /pol/ 
board often gamify mass violence by portraying casualty counts as scores and lionizing 
perpetrators of such events.216 The first document, which was quickly taken down, was titled 
“P._Crusius – Notification Letter.”217 The poster identified the second document as his 
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manifesto, titling it “The Inconvenient Truth.”218 It read, “This attack is a response to the 
Hispanic invasion of Texas. They are the instigators, not me. I am simply defending my country 
from cultural and ethnic replacement brought on by the invasion.”219 The 2,300-word manifesto 
discussed Crusius’s racial and political grievances and his particular disdain for immigrants. The 
document is divided into five sections: political motivations, economic factors, equipment 
utilization, expected reactions, and personal thoughts.220 The ideologies throughout the manifesto 
are disjointed and inconsistent, but white supremacist narratives —including concern over racial 
“mixing”— persist throughout.221  
 Patrick Crusius socialized radical ideologies entirely online within the virtual community 
provided by 8chan. There is no evidence that he communicated privately with radical individuals 
or formal organizations. Instead, he utilized the public web forum as a way to discover and 
interact with extremist material anonymously. Crusius absorbed significant amounts of one-way 
content including lengthy manifestos from past ideological extremists. Interestingly, his own 
manifesto was ideologically scattered, indicating that he may have simply regurgitated ideations 
from others without ever socializing his own thoughts. In fact, Crusius’s grandfather noted that 
despite the disjointedness of the document, the language in the manifesto seemed too 
sophisticated to be produced entirely by Crusius.222 It does not appear Crusius put significant 
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planning into his attack. He simply selected a location far from family and in an area where he 
felt he could target minorities. He purchased the ammunition and rifle used in the attack online, 
but he did not socialize his intentions prior to uploading his manifesto to 8chan.  This was a case 
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Part IV: Analysis & Discussion 
Analysis  
 The study was designed around evidence from past research which indicated that 
different types of extremist organizations pursued distinct techniques when engaging 
sympathizers online. Previous literature suggested that VIEs like ISIS and Al Qaeda attempt to 
create breeding grounds on the internet by creating interactive, gamified user experiences. A 
study conducted by J.M. Berger indicates that these groups also groom online recruits in a 
manner meant to mimic escalatory socialization mechanisms. Conversely, literature shows that 
RRE organizations hope to propagate enough radical material to legitimize alternative narratives 
and undermine traditional information resources. They do so by manipulating search algorithms, 
denouncing traditional media sources, and creating large-scale information campaigns. Isolated 
individuals can easily find themselves in echo chambers where radical ideologies are reinforced 
and normalized.  
 Although research exists assessing how extremist organizations have utilized the internet, 
there is little empirical evidence comparing the unique experiences of the targeted audience, 
particularly as they relate to the strategies adopted by different types of extremist organizations. 
Table 6: Variables Displayed by Patrick Crusius  
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This gap led to the research question of whether individual actors were influenced by online 
mobilization techniques in the way larger radical groups intended. The initial hypothesis (H1) 
presumed online behaviors differed between VIE and RRE actors. The sub hypotheses expected 
to find VIE actors partaking in more interactive web-based engagement and RRE actors to be 
consumers of one-way content. However, comparative case study analysis of the role the internet  
played in the radicalization process leading up to six major extremist events did not support the  
hypotheses. Instead, the study shows that online behaviors are consistent among actor type.  
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The research categorized online behaviors as either interactive or non-interactive. The 
latter category included one-way consumption of radical materials and one-way publication of 
ideology – such as manifestos or pledges to unaffiliated groups. Within the cases studied, such 
posts did not definitely further the examined actors’ radicalization. Rather, manifestos and 
pledges were shared just prior to the attacks, indicating that the actor had radicalized prior to 
publicly disseminating extremist views. From there, interactive and non-interactive behaviors 
were examined against actor type.  
The findings show five instances of interactive behaviors among VIE actors and seven among 
RRE actors. Socialization of ideology in public forums was demonstrated equally across both 
communities, while socialization of ideology in private messages was utilized more often in VIE 
cases. Neither VIE or RRE actors sought formal mentorship from a known extremist 
organization. Further, apart from Dylann Roof briefly soliciting a tour of Charleston via 
Craigslist, extremist actors proved unlikely to seek assistance via the web. Finally, interaction 
within a virtual community was more prevalent amongst RRE cases than VIE – almost directly 
contradicting expected results. Of note, contradictory reports regarding Dylann Roof’s 
involvement in virtual communities made the variable too difficult to code, leading to its 
exclusion from the analysis. Additionally, only one source provided information suggesting Roof 
posted radical ideations in a public, online forum. The data was included in the analysis, but the 
result may be misleading due to a lack of substantiation.  
Non-interactive internet behaviors were split equally among actor type, with both groups 
displaying seven counts of individual radical internet activity. In fact, the most consistent 
behavior present in the study was the absorption of radical materials (e.g., videos, magazines, 
and static websites), with consumption of one-way information evident in every case. Both types 
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of actors partook in online planning activities and pre-attack pronouncements. VIE actors tended 
pledge allegiance to unaffiliated groups while RRE actors showed a higher likelihood of issuing 
online ideological manifestos. The RRE tendency of publishing manifestos aligned with H1b 
given that the sub-hypothesis resulted from the understanding that the radical right intends to 
perpetuate alternative narratives and awaken others to grievances. 
  The VIE and RRE extremists examined in this study exhibited very similar online 
behaviors. If anything, RRE cases showed somewhat more online interaction than VIE, 
demonstrating an inverse of the anticipated results. That said, this elevated level of interaction is 
not statistically significant due to uncertain findings in the Roof case. Therefore, this study 
cannot definitively identify a clear trend. Instead, it shows that VIE and RRE actors interface 
comparably online during individual radicalization processes, despite the different mobilization 
techniques utilized by larger extremist organizations.  
Discussion 
 This research project was initially framed as an examination of the internet’s effect on the 
radicalization process. However, as the study progressed, it revealed more about how various 
actors interacted with online materials rather than the way the internet’s structural characteristics 
encouraged the process. A clear correlation is evident between radicalization and certain internet 
behaviors; namely the consistent, one-way consumption of extremist materials. However, the 
study sought to understand whether the online radicalization phenomenon differed between 
different types of extremist actors. The research did not seek to establish a causal relationship 
between the internet and the radicalization process. How the internet’s characteristics and 
mechanisms – such as the means with which individuals search and receive information – affect 
rates of radicalization may be explored in future research. Such analysis can build upon the 
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findings from this study which suggest the web-based radicalization behaviors are consistent 
across actor type.    
 A second potential study could assess the replicability of results in different regions. This 
study assessed extremist actors within the United States. It would be relevant to determine 
whether the findings remained consistent in areas where grievances differ, or internet access is 
more controlled. Alternatively, research may comparatively analyze internet usage in the 
radicalization process of other types of violent ideological extremists, as this project only 
considered two groups. Future research could also expand upon current findings by introducing 
quantitative elements with additional data points from further case studies. Lastly, this 
assessment was constrained by available information and relied heavily on high profile cases 
with significant media coverage. Additional time and resources could generate more data from 
additional cases to verify findings. Interviews with living perpetrators would also provide 
relevant information that was not available in this study.  
Conclusion 
 The determination that radicalization activities are consistent across actor types is an 
important addition to literature for multiple reasons. First, past studies established that extremist 
organizations approach online mobilization strategies differently. Despite this, the phenomenon 
of virtual radicalization manifests similarly among actor types. Second, recognizing the 
commonalities may better inform policy and assist counterterrorism efforts, particularly as mass 
violence events are increasingly perpetrated by homegrown and domestic extremists rather than 
members of known, transnational terror cells.223 As such, it is imperative to understand how 
 
223 Jason Burke, “The Age of Selfie Jihad: How Evolving Media Technology Is Changing Terrorism,” Combating 




potential terrorists engage with radical, mobilizing content. Finally, the global pandemic has 
introduced new grievances worldwide. It has also isolated much of the populace for significant 
periods of time, leaving the internet as the primary social outlet for much of the population. It is 
possible that the conditions imposed by COVID-19 on society will lead to increased 
radicalization and mass violence events. Aggrieved, isolated individuals may follow internet 
rabbit holes, finding themselves in radical echo chambers and engaging in online behaviors 
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